Abstraction and Control of TE Networks (ACTN) refers to the set of virtual network (VN) operations needed to orchestrate, control and manage large-scale multi-domain TE networks so as to facilitate network programmability, automation, efficient resource sharing, and end-to-end virtual service aware connectivity and network function virtualization services.
Introduction
Abstraction and Control of TE Networks (ACTN) [RFC8453] refers to the set of virtual network (VN) operations needed to orchestrate, control and manage large-scale multi-domain TE networks so as to facilitate network programmability, automation, efficient resource sharing, and end-to-end virtual service aware connectivity and network function virtualization services. The Path Computation Element (PCE) [RFC4655] is a component, application, or network node that is capable of computing a network path or route based on a network graph and applying computational constraints. The PCE serves requests from Path Computation Clients (PCCs) that communicate with it over a local API or using the Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP).
This document examines the PCE and ACTN architecture and describes how PCE architecture is applicable to ACTN. It also lists the PCEP extensions that are needed to use PCEP as an ACTN interface. This document also identifies any gaps in PCEP, that exist at the time of publication of this document.
Further, ACTN, stateful H-PCE [I-D.ietf-pce-stateful-hpce], and PCE as a central controller (PCECC) [RFC8283] are based on the same basic hierarchy framework and thus compatible with each other.
Background Information

Path Computation Element (PCE)
The Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP) [RFC5440] provides mechanisms for Path Computation Clients (PCCs) to request a Path Computation Element (PCE) [RFC4655] to perform path computations.
The ability to compute shortest constrained TE LSPs in Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) and Generalized MPLS (GMPLS) networks across multiple domains has been identified as a key motivation for PCE development.
A stateful PCE [RFC8231] is capable of considering, for the purposes of path computation, not only the network state in terms of links and nodes (referred to as the Traffic Engineering Database or TED) but also the status of active services (previously computed paths), and currently reserved resources, stored in the Label Switched Paths Database (LSP-DB).
[RFC8051] describes general considerations for a stateful PCE deployment and examines its applicability and benefits, as well as its challenges and limitations through a number of use cases.
[RFC8231] describes a set of extensions to PCEP to provide stateful control. A stateful PCE has access to not only the information carried by the network's Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP), but also the set of active paths and their reserved resources for its computations. [RFC7149] refers to a separation between the control elements and the forwarding components so that software running in a centralized system called a controller, can act to program the devices in the network to behave in specific ways. A required element in an SDN architecture is a component that plans how the network resources will be used and how the devices will be programmed. It is possible to view this component as performing specific computations to place flows within the network given knowledge of the availability of network resources, how other forwarding devices are programmed, and the way that other flows are routed. It is concluded in [RFC7399] , that this is the same function that a PCE might offer in a network operated using a dynamic control plane. This is the function and purpose of a PCE, and the way that a PCE integrates into a wider network control system including SDN is presented in Application-Based Network Operation (ABNO) [RFC7491] .
PCE in Multi-domain and Multi-layer Deployments
Computing paths across large multi-domain environments requires special computational components and cooperation between entities in different domains capable of complex path computation. The PCE provides an architecture and a set of functional components to address this problem space. A PCE may be used to compute end-to-end paths across multi-domain environments using a per-domain path computation technique [RFC5152] . The Backward Recursive PCE based path computation (BRPC) mechanism [RFC5441] defines a PCE-based path computation procedure to compute inter-domain constrained MPLS and GMPLS TE networks. However, per-domain technique assumes that the sequence of domains to be crossed from source to destination is known, either fixed by the network operator or obtained by other means. BRPC can work best with a known domain sequence, and it will also work nicely with a small set of interconnected domains. However, it doesn't work well for is a large set of interconnected domains. The ACTN reference architecture is shown in Figure 1 which is reproduced here from [RFC8453] for convenience. [RFC8453] remains the definitive reference for the ACTN architecture. As depicted in Figure 1 , the ACTN architecture identifies a three-tier hierarchy. 
Figure 1: ACTN Hierarchy
There are two interfaces with respect to the MDSC: one north of the MDSC (the CNC-MDSC Interface : CMI), and one south (the MDSC-PNC Interface : MPI). A hierarchy of MDSCs is possible with a recursive MPI interface.
[RFC8454] provides an information model for ACTN interfaces. [RFC7752] to get access to the topology and support abstraction function.
Multi-Domain Coordination via Hierarchy
With the definition of domain being "everything that is under the control of the single logical controller", as per [RFC8453] , it is needed to have a control entity that oversees the specific aspects of the different domains and to build a single abstracted end-to-end network topology in order to coordinate end-to-end path computation and path/service provisioning.
The MDSC in ACTN framework realizes this function by coordinating the per-domain PNCs in a hierarchy of controllers. It also needs to detach from the underlying network technology and express customer concerns by business needs. [I-D.dhodylee-pce-pcep-ls] proposes another approach for learning and maintaining the Link-State and TE information as an alternative to IGPs and BGP flooding, using PCEP itself. The Child PCE can use this mechanism to transport Link-State and TE information from Child PCE to a Parent PCE using PCEP.
In ACTN, there is a need to control the level of abstraction based on the deployment scenario and business relationship between the controllers. The mechanism used to disseminate information from PNC (Child PCE) to MDSC (Parent PCE) should support abstraction. [RFC8453] discusses two ways to build abstract topology from an MDSC standpoint with interaction with PNCs. The primary method is called automatic generation of abstract topology by configuration. With this method, automatic generation is based on the abstraction/ summarization of the whole domain by the PNC and its advertisement on the MPI. The secondary method is called on-demand generation of supplementary topology via Path Compute Request/Reply. This method may be needed to obtain further complementary information such as potential connectivity from Child PCEs in order to facilitate an endto-end path provisioning. PCEP is well suited to support both methods.
Customer Mapping
In ACTN, there is a need to map customer virtual network (VN) requirements into a network provisioning request to the PNC. That is, the customer requests/commands are mapped by the MDSC into network provisioning requests that can be sent to the PNC. Specifically, the MDSC provides mapping and translation of a customer's service request into a set of parameters that are specific to a network type and technology such that network configuration process is made possible. PCEP is especially suitable on the MPI as it meets the requirement and the functions as set out in the ACTN framework [RFC8453] . Its recursive nature is well suited via the multi-level hierarchy of PCE. PCEP can also be applied to the CMI as the CNC can be a path computation client while the MDSC can be a path computation server. Section 5 describes how PCE and PCEP could help realize ACTN on the MPI.
Realizing ACTN with PCE (and PCEP)
As per the example in the TED to compute path in its domain. As described in Section 3.2, it can learn the topology via IGP or BGP-LS. PCEP-LS is also a proposed mechanism to carry link state and traffic engineering information within PCEP. A mechanism to carry abstracted topology while hiding technology specific information between PNC and MDSC is described in [I-D.dhodylee-pce-pcep-ls]. At the end of this step the MDSC (or Parent PCE) has the abstracted topology from each of its PNC (or Child PCE). This could be as simple as a domain topology map as described in [RFC6805] . A suitable stitching mechanism would be used to stitch these per domain LSPs. One such mechanism is described in 
Security Considerations
Various security considerations for PCEP are described in [RFC5440] and [RFC8253] . Security considerations as stated in Section 10.1, Section 10.6, and Section 10.7 of [RFC5440] continue to apply on PCEP when used as ACTN interface. Further, this document lists various extensions of PCEP that are applicable, each of them specify various security considerations which continue to apply here.
The ACTN framework described in [RFC8453] defines key components and interfaces for managed traffic engineered networks. It also lists various security considerations such as request and control of resources, confidentially of the information, and availability of function which should be taken into consideration.
As per [RFC8453] , securing the request and control of resources, confidentiality of the information, and availability of function should all be critical security considerations when deploying and operating ACTN platforms. From a security and reliability perspective, ACTN may encounter many risks such as malicious attack and rogue elements attempting to connect to various ACTN components (with PCE being one of them). Furthermore, some ACTN components represent a single point of failure and threat vector and must also manage policy conflicts and eavesdropping of communication between different ACTN components. [RFC8453] further states that all protocols used to realize the ACTN framework should have rich security features, and customer, application and network data should be stored in encrypted data stores. When PCEP is used as an ACTN interface, the security of PCEP provided by Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC8253] , as per the recommendations and best current practices in [RFC7525] (unless explicitly set aside in [RFC8253] ), is used.
As per [RFC8453] , regarding the MPI, a PKI-based mechanism is suggested, such as building a TLS or HTTPS connection between the MDSC and PNCs, to ensure trust between the physical network layer control components and the MDSC. Which MDSC the PNC exports topology information to, and the level of detail (full or abstracted), should also be authenticated, and specific access restrictions and topology views should be configurable and/or policy based. When PCEP is used in MPI, the security functions as per [RFC8253] are used to fulfill these requirements. As per [RFC8453] , regarding the CMI, suitable authentication and authorization of each CNC connecting to the MDSC will be required. If PCEP is used in CMI, the security functions as per [RFC8253] can be used to support peer authentication, message encryption, and integrity checks.
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